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Globalization has created various challenges for world economies, making global 
cooperation a necessity.  Global public goods have become a key issue for countries in 
the midst of the globalization trend.  One possible example to global public goods is the 
prevention of regional conflicts and maintaining peace around the world.  This has 
particular relevance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since it’s 
considered one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world.  This paper examines the 
economic spillover effects of regional conflicts as a public bad to determine the 
significance of conflict prevention as a global public good.  The study builds on an 
extended model of optimal public good provision and focuses on the MENA region, 
considering spatial dependence between countries.  UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
(Version 4-2006b) is used for conflicts in the period 1971-2004. These results show 
evidence of a significant negative link between armed conflicts and GDP per capita.  
MENA countries show a particularly greater negative impact from internationalized 
internal conflicts. Results from spatial analysis show evidence of cross-country spillovers 
or negative externalities from armed conflicts. This can be interpreted as further evidence 
of cross-country externalities and makes regional conflict prevention fit into the global 
public good framework. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent globalization trend has created various challenges for world economies, 
making global cooperation a necessity.  Global public goods have become a key issue for 
countries in the midst of the globalization trend.  A global public good is a good “with 
benefits, or costs in the case of public bads, that extend across countries and regions, 
across rich and poor population groups and even across generations” (Kaul et al., 
2003:2). One possible example to global public goods is the prevention of regional 
conflicts and maintaining peace around the world.  This has particular relevance to the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since it’s considered one of the most 
conflict-ridden regions in the world.1   
World history is full of conflicts between nations. There is much confusion, 
however, in the use of the term “conflict” and the contexts it has been used. For example, 
while privateering by corsairs in the Mediterranean was traditionally defined as “merely a 
means of making a living” (Braudel, 1995)2, it has recently been portrayed in popular 
media and elsewhere as an example of outright conflict between civilizations (or 
religions), even referred to as state sponsored terrorism to draw parallel with recent 
terrorist activities.3 To be consistent with data, we use “armed conflict” as defined by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested 
                                                 
1
 See Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2004) for a chronology and detailed discussion of conflicts in the 
Middle East since 1945. 
2
 Braudel refers to privateering as an ancient form of piracy native to the Mediterranean, with its own 
familiar customs, agreements and negotiations. He asserts that it had “little to do with either country or 
faith, but was merely a means of making a living.” This form of Mediterranean privateering ended in early 
19th century.  
3
 See Leiby (2001) and Woodward (2004). Unfortunately, Barbary corsairs were singled out in such 
comparison while largely ignoring similar privateering activities by Christian corsairs in the Mediterranean 
in the same historical period. Fisher (1957), Braudel (1995) and recently Naylor (2006) all point to this 
misconception.  
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incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths”4 (UCDP and PRIO, 2006). 
This paper examines the economic spillover effects of regional conflicts as a 
public bad to determine the significance of conflict prevention as a global public good.  
The study builds on an extended model of optimal public good provision from the public 
finance literature and focuses on the MENA region, considering the spatial dependence 
between countries.  UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2006b) from the 
Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO) and Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University is used 
broadly for conflicts in the period 1971-2004. 
 The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a brief review of the 
relevant literature on public goods provision in a global framework including Agnar 
Sandmo’s extension of Paul Samuelson’s public goods provision model.  Section 3 lays 
out our empirical approach and discusses the data used in our regression analysis.  
Section 4 presents the regression results.  The last section provides our concluding 
remarks.  
2. Internationalizing Public Goods 
We start with a standard public goods provision model originally explained by 
Samuelson (1954, 1955).  In this model, social planner’s problem is to maximize a social 
welfare function, ( )1 2, ,......, nU U UΨ which is a function of individual utilities 
                                                 
4
 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook (Version 4-2006b) explains the separate elements of this 
definition. 
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This gives YX
n
i
i
YX MRTMRS =∑
=1
 which is the Samuelson condition for the Pareto Efficient 
provision of the public good y. 
 Sandmo (2003) extends the above standard Samuelson model to a world with two 
countries, one rich and one poor.  In Sandmo's model rich country (R) has n consumers 
and poor country (P) has m consumers. There is still one private good but the public good 
becomes a global public good and the global public good is the sum of individual 
countries' contributions where R Py y y= + .  Social planner’s problem changes to the 
maximization of the social welfare function, ( )1 1,...., ; ,....,G R nR P mPU U U UΨ which is a 
function of individual utilities ( ),iR iR iRU U x y=  and ( ),jP jP jPU U x y= , subject to 
respective economies’ resource constraints ( ), 0R R RF x y = , and ( ), 0P P PF x y =  where 
i=1,….n, and j=1,….m. Hence iRx  is the private good consumption of the i’th individual 
in country R and jPx  is the private good consumption of the j’th individual in country P. 
Here Rx and Px are the aggregate values of the private goods such that iR R
i
x x=∑ and 
jP P
j x x=∑ . 
Ry and Py are the public good contributions of rich and poor countries, 
respectively.  Sandmo uses quasilinear forms for the economy resource constraints 
( ) 0R R R Rx C y R+ − = , and ( ) 0P P P Px C y R+ − = , where RC  and PC  are assumed to be 
continuous functions with positive first and second derivatives.  Global welfare 
maximization requires maximization of the global social welfare function, GΨ , subject to 
the economy resource constraints and the following additional constraint that ties world 
consumption to world production: iR jP R P
i jx x x x+ = +∑ ∑ , which requires world 
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consumption to equal world production.  This maximization problem gives rise to the 
following first order conditions:5 
R P
y y yC C C= ≡            (5) 
( ) ( )iR iR jP jPy x y x yi jU U U U C+ =∑ ∑        (6) 
G iR G jP
iR x jP xU UΨ = Ψ   i= 1,…,n; j= 1,…,m.      (7) 
 These optimum conditions have clear interpretations. Equation (5) is an efficiency 
condition for global production of the public good. It’s also highlighting the workings of 
comparative advantage in the production of the public good. The country that can 
produce the public good cheaper should provide more of it. Equation (6) is the extension 
of the Samuelson condition in equation (4) to two-country model. As in equation (4) it 
requires sum of marginal rate of substitutions to equal marginal rate of transformation. 
The difference is the left-hand side of the equation is the sum of the sums of marginal 
rate of substitutions for each country and the right-hand side is the global marginal rate of 
transformation since y is the public good not only in the national sense but also in the 
global sense.  Finally, equation (7) is an equity condition for the distribution of resources 
between individuals in each country and also between countries. Hence this condition 
implies international transfers between countries.  For example, if the global production 
efficiency condition (equation 5) requires poor country to provide more for the provision 
of a public good such as armed conflict prevention (in terms of national quards and other 
public safety expenditures), equation 7 indicates that the loss of resources in poor country 
for private consumption can then be compensated for by international transfers of income 
or consumption from rich county to poor country. 
                                                 
5
 A detailed solution of the model is available from authors upon request.  
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 The framework laid out above shows that the standard public good provision model 
by Samuelson can easily be extended to global public goods where two countries or 
regions interact in the provision of the public good. As another byproduct, the extended 
model also indicates a role for international transfers in terms of foreign aid or 
development assistance to countries or regions that provide much of the public good for 
the benefit of all countries in the world.  This would even indirectly call for the 
establishment of an international governing body that oversees the public good provision 
and manages the transfer of such funds between countries.  Regional conflict prevention 
could be an interesting application of this as long as the global public good nature is 
established at least empirically. Institutional implications of international resource 
transfers could also be quite relevant in the case of conflict prevention since we already 
have an institutional framework in reality through such international organizations as 
United Nations and NATO.  Next, in our analysis, we will explore whether regional 
conflict prevention fits global public good framework explained in this section. For this, 
it is vital to find evidence of the existence of cross-country negative externalities from 
armed conflicts so that prevention of such conflicts would be considered a public good. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Approach 
 
Data 
The years, intensity and types of conflicts for the period 1970-2004 are compiled 
from Armed Conflicts Version 4-2006b dataset, prepared by Uppsala University, Center 
for the Study of Civil War in Norway. Armed Conflicts Version 4-2006b dataset groups 
conflicts into three categories: Minor armed conflicts that result with at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the 
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conflict. Intermediate armed conflicts are those that result with at least 25, but fewer than 
1,000 battle-related deaths in a year and an accumulated total of more than 1,000 deaths. 
Conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year are called war. The dataset 
divides conflicts into four types: Internal conflicts are those between a government and a 
non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries. Interstate conflicts are 
between two or more governments. Internationalized internal conflicts are within a 
country between a government and a non-governmental party; where the government, the 
opposition or both sides receive troop support from other governments. Extrastate 
conflicts are the ones that are between a colonialist government and a non-governmental 
party. GDP figures used in this study are taken from United Nations Statistics. Per capita 
GDP at current prices in US dollars are converted into per capita GDP at 2000 prices in 
US dollars by using real effective exchange rate index taken from World Development 
Indicators 2005. 
Table 1 gives the summary statistics of data for the MENA countries, including 
averages for MENA and Non-MENA country groups.  On average, MENA countries 
have more armed conflict years than other countries.  They also have more intermediate 
conflict, war, interstate and internationalized internal conflict years than other countries.  
On the other hand, they have lower minor conflict and internal conflict years than other 
countries.  MENA countries have particularly high number of war years with Sudan 
leading with 21 war years out of 34 years in the period of study.  Sudan also has the 
highest number of internal conflict years (25) followed by Turkey (22) and Pakistan (20).  
Lebanon has significantly higher number of internationalized internal conflict years (16) 
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compared to other MENA countries.  In terms of total armed conflict years, Iraq leads 
with 26 conflict years, followed closely by Sudan (25) and Turkey (22). 
Empirical Methodology 
We use regression analysis to estimate the impact of armed conflicts on GDP per 
capita of countries.  The data are a panel of 3026 observations that include 89 countries 
for years 1971 through 2004.  Summary statistics of regression variables for the entire 
sample of countries is given in Table 2.  Two conventional approaches for estimating 
panel data are the fixed-effects and random-effects procedures.  However, if the 
individual country fixed-effects are correlated with other exogenous variables, the 
random-effects estimation procedure yields inconsistent estimates.  A fixed effects model 
has the advantage of removing the bias from the estimation caused by a possible 
correlation between explanatory variables and time-invariant country specific effects. 
Hausman specification test shows that the fixed country-effects are correlated with the 
other exogenous variables in some of the regressions, which suggests that the fixed-
effects estimation procedure could be more appropriate for this analysis.   
Our discussion in section 2 about regional or global externalities from armed 
conflicts points to spatial correlations between GDP of different countries, particularly 
contiguous ones. First introduced by Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988), models of 
spatial dependence account for any direct influence of spatial neighbors, spillover effects, 
and externalities generated between cross-sectional observations (in this research the unit 
of observation is countries).  Failing to address spatial dependence may lead to biased, 
inefficient, and/or inconsistent coefficient estimates.  In order to test for spatial 
autocorrelation in the data, we conducted diagnostic tests for a cross-section of averages 
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from the period 1971-2004.  For this, we created a spatial weights matrix that shows the 
presence of potential spatial interaction between neighboring countries.  We ran 
diagnostic tests for both the spatial error and spatial lag models (Anselin et al., 1996).  In 
a spatial error model there is an autoregressive process in the error term, whereas a spatial 
lag model assumes a spatially lagged dependent variable.  Lagrange multiplier test 
statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that autoregressive parameters are equal to 
zero.6  The null hypothesis is rejected, indicating the presence of spatial autocorrelation. 
Spatial dependence is caused by the existence of spillover effects between units of 
observation (countries) and the presence of a direct influence from activity in one country 
on neighboring countries.  In this case, it may be that economic activity measured by 
GDP in one country affect GDP per capita in neighboring countries.  We therefore run 
separate regressions using the spatial lag model. 
 In all the regressions, we use GDP per capita as the dependent variable. 
Explanatory variables are the armed conflict variables described above in the Data 
section and we also use country dummies to run fixed effects regressions. Specific 
regressions and results are explained in the next section.  
4. Empirical Results 
 
Empirical results are provided in Tables 3 through 5. We start in Table 3 with 
regressions for all 89 countries without particular reference to MENA countries.  As 
expected, column (1) shows that having an armed conflict has a negative and highly 
significant effect on the per capita GDP of the country that experiences armed conflict. 
                                                 
6
 Spatial data analysis commands developed by Pisati (2001) for STATA are used to conduct the spatial 
autocorrelation diagnostic tests.  Diagnostic test output presents Moran’s I, Lagrange multiplier and Robust 
Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for the spatial error model and Lagrange multiplier and Robust Lagrange 
Multiplier test statistics for the spatial lag model.  See Anselin et al. (1996) for a detailed explanation of 
these tests. 
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Column (2) regression distinguishes between three degrees of armed conflict: minor, 
intermediate and (war). All three degrees are found to be negative and statistically 
significant with particularly strong effects from minor armed conflict and war. 
Alternatively, column (3) distinguishes between different types of armed conflict.  The 
first three types, internal, interstate and internationalized internal conflicts are all found to 
have negative effects with statistical significance established only for internal and 
interstate conflicts.  Interestingly, extrastate conflict is found to have a statistically 
significant positive effect which seems to be counterintuitive. 
 In Table 4, we extend to include interactions of the variables in Table 3 with a 
dummy for the MENA countries. The dummy itself is removed from the regressions due 
to country dummies used in fixed-effects regressions.  The first column shows that 
Armed Conflict has a negative and significant effect on GDP per capita as in Table 3. 
Interaction between MENA dummy and Armed Conflict is also negative indicating a 
relatively stronger negative effect of armed conflicts in MENA countries. This effect, 
however, is not found to be statistically significant.  Column (2) separates armed conflicts 
into minor and intermediate armed conflicts and war. All three conflict degrees are found 
to be negative and significant while none of the interactions with the MENA dummy is 
significant. Interaction between Internal Conflict and MENA dummy is positive but not 
significant.  These results show that the effects of different degrees of armed conflicts on 
GDP are not significantly different in MENA countries.  Column (3) of Table 4 separates 
armed conflicts into internal, interstate, internationalized and extrastate conflicts.  
Overall, different types of conflicts have negative effect on GDP per capita in MENA 
countries with the exception of extrastate conflict. In fact, data shows that there is no 
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reported extrastate conflict in MENA countries in the 1971-2004 period. The effect of 
internationalized internal conflicts is particularly strong and significant in MENA 
countries compared to other countries in the sample.  On the other hand, the negative 
effect of internal conflicts is relatively smaller in MENA countries compared to others. 
 In Table 5, we repeat the regressions in Table 4 correcting for spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable. Due to missing observations, we are moving 
away from the panel data form and run cross sectional regressions on the averages of 
variables for the entire 1971-2004 period.  We start by examining the autocorrelation 
parameter, ρ, of the lagged dependent variable.  ρ is found to be around 0.4 in all three 
regressions. It is also found to be significant according to Wald, Likelihood Ratio and 
Lagrange Multiplier tests reported at the bottom of Table 5.  Additional diagnostic tests 
using Moran’s I and Lagrange Multiplier test statistics also revealed presence of spatial 
dependence.  This is important for our analysis since such spatial dependence points to 
cross-country externalities.  Results in column (1) show that armed conflicts have a 
particularly strong and negative effect on GDP per capita in MENA countries. This is 
controlling for the fact that MENA countries on average have higher GDP per capita than 
other conflict-ridden countries in the sample. Of course, this is partly driven by oil-rich 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the MENA group.  Column (2) shows that 
armed conflicts by different degrees have a negative effect on GDP in MENA countries.  
These negative effects are statistically significant for minor and intermediate armed 
conflicts but not for wars. Finally, column (3) shows that only internal and 
internationalized internal conflicts are negative and statistically significant for MENA 
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countries, with particularly strong and significant effect from internationalized internal 
conflicts. 
 These results show evidence of a significant negative link between armed 
conflicts and GDP per capita.  Overall, minor conflicts and war have particularly strong 
negative effects. MENA countries show a particularly greater negative impact from 
certain conflicts, especially internationalized internal conflicts. This matches our 
expectation that conflicts with international involvement would create greater 
externalities. Results from spatial analysis show evidence of cross-country spillovers or 
negative externalities from armed conflicts. This can be interpreted as further evidence of 
cross-country externalities and makes regional conflict prevention fit into the global 
public good framework. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we examined the economic spillover effects of regional conflicts as a 
public bad to determine the significance of conflict prevention as a global public good.  
We used UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2006b) from the Centre for the 
Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University for conflicts in the 
period 1971-2004.  Our regional focus was the MENA region with higher than average 
number of armed conflicts and particularly more intermediate conflict, war, interstate and 
internationalized internal conflict years than other countries.  Our results generally give 
support to the treatment of conflict prevention efforts as a global public good. This would 
allow researchers to consider conflict prevention in the global public good provision 
framework that is also sketched in this paper.  It also makes it possible to study 
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institutional framework regarding international transfers between countries to help with 
the provision of regional conflict prevention efforts. We leave examination of current 
prevention efforts and possible reforms for future research. 
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Table 1 
MENA Country Summary Statistics 
                    
Country Period 
Average 
GDP per 
Capita 
($) 
Number 
of 
Conflict 
Years 
Number 
of Minor 
Conflict 
Years 
Number of 
Intermediate 
Conflict Years 
Number 
of War 
Years 
Number 
of Internal 
Conflict 
Years 
Number of 
Interstate 
Conflict 
Years 
Number of 
Internationalized 
Internal Conflict 
Years 
Algeria 1971-2004 2,583 14 2 3 9 14 0 0 
Djibouti 1971-2004 1,197 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 
Egypt 1971-2004 1,015 7 6 0 1 6 0 0 
Iran 1971-2004 2,756 20 1 6 13 10 10 0 
Iraq 1971-2004 1,295 26 0 12 14 14 11 1 
Kuwait 1971-2004 19,898 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Lebanon 1971-2004 2,917 16 1 9 6 0 0 16 
Libyan Arab Republic 1971-2004 9,739 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Morocco 1971-2004 1,241 16 1 9 6 16 0 0 
Oman 1971-2004 7,081 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Pakistan 1971-2004 583 20 1 17 2 20 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 1971-2004 11,739 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Sudan 1971-2004 585 25 0 4 21 25 0 0 
Syria 1971-2004 1,551 5 3 0 2 5 0 0 
Tunisia 1971-2004 1,955 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Turkey 1971-2004 2,690 22 3 12 7 22 0 0 
          
MENA Average 1971-2004 4,302 11.6 1.9 4.5 5.2 8.7 1.4 1.4 
Non-MENA Average 1971-2004 2,303 10.1 3.1 3.5 3.6 9.1 0.9 0.1 
 
Source:  
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
      
    
Variable Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GDP per Capita in constant dollars 2872 2,804.6200 4,927.3740 68.4 39600 
MENA Dummy 3026 0.1798 0.3841 0 1 
Armed Conflict 3026 0.3057 0.4608 0 1 
MENA*Armed Conflict 3026 0.0611 0.2396 0 1 
Minor Armed Conflict 3026 0.0836 0.2768 0 1 
Intermediate Armed Conflict 3026 0.1084 0.3109 0 1 
War 3026 0.1137 0.3175 0 1 
MENA*Minor Armed Conflict 3026 0.0099 0.0991 0 1 
MENA*Intermediate Armed Conflict 3026 0.0238 0.1524 0 1 
MENA*War 3026 0.0274 0.1634 0 1 
Internal Conflict 3026 0.2647 0.4412 0 1 
Interstate Conflict 3026 0.0284 0.1662 0 1 
Internationalized Internal Conflict 3026 0.0106 0.1023 0 1 
Extrastate Conflict 3026 0.0013 0.0363 0 1 
MENA*Internal Conflict 3026 0.0459 0.2094 0 1 
MENA*Interstate Conflict 3026 0.0076 0.0869 0 1 
MENA*Internationalized Internal Conflict  3026 0.0073 0.0850 0 1 
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Table 3 
Dependent Variable: GDP per Capita in Constant U.S. Dollars 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses^) 
       
 
  
  
  
Variable (1)   (2) 
  
(3)   
Armed Conflict -463.0230 ***     
 (99.8602)      
Minor Armed Conflict   -540.4083 ***   
   (138.4899)    
Intermediate Armed Conflict   -379.6684 ***   
   (129.3725)    
War   -429.5482 ***   
   (116.6378)    
Internal Conflict     -426.9900 *** 
     (86.1565)  
Interstate Conflict     -486.790 ** 
     216.160  
Internationalized Internal 
Conflict 
    -917.2933  
     (927.9874)  
Extrastate Conflict     371.3418 *** 
     (110.5577)  
Constant 349.4282 *** 353.6087 *** 349.3695 *** 
 (72.0919)  (74.9525)  (81.8189)  
       
Obs. 2872  2872  2872  
R-Squared 0.860   0.860   0.860   
Note: Due to space constraints we omit results for country dummies 
^Robust standard errors.       
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively 
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Table 4 
Dependent Variable: GDP per Capita in Constant U.S. Dollars 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses^) 
Variable (1)   (2) 
  
(3)   
Armed Conflict -435.8140 ***     
 (99.7258)      
MENA*Armed Conflict -114.9542      
 (290.4149)      
Minor Armed Conflict   -546.8077 ***   
   (119.3525)    
Intermediate Armed Conflict   -299.2692 *   
   (162.9381)    
War   -375.7403 ***   
   (110.9988)    
MENA*Minor Armed Conflict   163.7495    
   (696.6173)    
MENA*Intermediate Armed Conflict   -330.7353    
   (222.8519)    
MENA*War   -217.366    
   (329.0895)    
Internal Conflict     -499.0458 *** 
     (90.5904)  
Interstate Conflict     -573.408 *** 
     (184.7330)  
Internationalized Internal Conflict     2631.8610 * 
     (1386.4330)  
Extrastate Conflict     299.2861 *** 
     (114.0696)  
MENA*Internal Conflict     445.9184 * 
     (247.4072)  
MENA*Interstate Conflict     422.224  
     (694.0629)  
MENA*Internationalized Internal 
Conflict     -5803.085 *** 
     (1630.3070)  
Constant 338.9632 *** 342.1760 *** 380.4437 *** 
 (68.9123)  (70.9789)  (85.8893)  
       
Obs. 2872  2872  2872  
R-Squared 0.860   0.860   0.862   
Note: Due to space constraints we omit results for country dummies    
^Robust standard errors.       
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively  
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Table 5 
Dependent Variable: GDP per Capita in Constant U.S. Dollars 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses^) 
Variable (1)   (2) 
  
(3)   
MENA Dummy 4078.996 ** 7102.646 *** 4324.495 *** 
 (1710.0900)  (2114.7280)  (1646.9340)  
Armed Conflict 341.8727      
 (1424.3590)      
MENA*Armed Conflict -9368.919 **     
 (3895.7900)      
Minor Armed Conflict   -3702.2300    
   (5063.3830)    
Intermediate Armed Conflict   5766.6780 **   
   (2404.1820)    
War   -3939.9430    
   (2434.0790)    
MENA*Minor Armed Conflict   -51870.25 ***   
   (20030.7300)    
MENA*Intermediate Armed Conflict   -17693.71 ***   
   (6569.4070)    
MENA*War   -7501.433    
   (6264.9950)    
Internal Conflict     388.9214  
     (1454.9480)  
Interstate Conflict     -565.827  
     (5473.7040)  
Internationalized Internal Conflict     56618.8500 *** 
     (20359.3300)  
Extrastate Conflict     -7510.1850  
     (31964.0600)  
MENA*Internal Conflict     -10309.08 ** 
     (4194.8840)  
MENA*Interstate Conflict     -2379.772  
     (10548.7300)  
MENA*Internationalized Internal Conflict     -68588.12 *** 
     (22029.7000)  
Constant 1395.8540 ** 1614.8810 ** 1165.7100 * 
 (658.7808)  (676.2391)  (641.6379)  
Rho 0.4003 *** 0.4164 *** 0.4125 *** 
 (0.0984)  (0.1888)  (0.0973)  
       
Wald test, rho=0:                              χ2  = 16.5580  19.4470  17.9930  
Likelihood ratio test, rho=0:              χ2  = 13.5230  15.5750  14.4950  
Lagrange multiplier test, rho=0:        χ2  = 10.6320  11.9650  11.1640  
Obs. 89  89  89  
Variance Ratio 0.168   0.272   0.234   
^ *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively  
 
 
 
